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THE CURRENT STATE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: AN EXAMINATION OF
NORTHAMERICAN BMW v. GORE
Andrew L. Sparks*
Environmental degradation has been an unfortunate byproduct
of economic growth during the industrial period. In response to this
problem, Congress has enacted an array of legislation to deter further
contamination and remedy existing environmental hazards. The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act,1 (CERCLA), the Federal Facility Compliance Act2 (FFCA), and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act3 are representative of this
environmental legislation and provide a broad range of prohibitions and
punishments for environmental tortfeasors. In addition to the remedies
available under these regulations, many plaintiffs seek redress for
their harms under such common law theories as trespass, negligence,
and nuisance. To understand why many toxic tort actions are brought
under these common law principals, one need only examine the
remedies available under the respective actions. CERCLA, for
example, excludes punitive damages, allowing only for the imposition
of fines and cleanup costs. 4  Common law tort theories, which
recognize punitive damages, thus present an attractive alternative for
toxic tort plaintiffs in choosing their cause of action. Many questions,
however, have arisen over the past several years as to the appropriate
level and application of punitive damages.
A recent Supreme Court decision, North American BMW v.
Gore,' represents the Court's latest attempt to establish an appropriate
method of review for punitive damages. This case comment will
examine the nexus between toxic tort litigation and punitive damages.
Part I will examine the legal history and recent evolution of punitive
damage awards in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part H will explain the
facts, issues and opinions set forth in BMW. Subsequent judicial
decisions applying the standards set forth in BMWare examined in Part
I. The comment concludes by asserting that the decision in BMW
grants substantial discretionary power to trial courts and fails to
*Editor-ln-Chief, Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law. B.A.,
Transylvania University, 1997; .J.D. expected 2000, University of Kentucky College of Law.
142 U.S.C. §9601 et seq. (1996).
242 U.S.C. §6901 et seq. (1996).
333 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. (1996).
442 U.SC. §9607(a)(4).
5517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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establish a uniform national standard for punitive damages. This,
however, does not adversely affect a plaintiffs ability to receive
punitive damages in a toxic tort action.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages are awarded to plaintiffs in addition to full
compensation for their injuries.6 The most frequently cited rationale
for punitive damages is to "punish the defendant for outrageous
misconduct and to deter the defendant and others from similarly
misbehaving in the future."7 To warrant the imposition of punitive
damages, "[tihere must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage,
such as 'spite' or 'malice' or a fraudulent or evil motive," or conduct
that constitutes a willful disregard for the interests of others.' Punitive
damages have become an integral and often criticized component of the
modem judicial system. In light of these criticisms and the Supreme
Court's latest decision regarding exemplary damages, an evaluation of
the current state of punitive damages is in order.
A. History
The concept of punitive damages is not new. The precursor of
today's exemplary award can be traced to the Babylonian Code of
Hammurabi, which specifically provided for the award of multiple
damages.9 England, from which America developed much of its
common law, first recognized punitive damages in 1275,'° and similar
awards appeared in America in 1784.1 The Supreme Court has
observed that "the practice of awarding damages far in excess of actual
compensation for quantifiable injuries was well recognized at the time
the Framer's produced the Eighth Amendment" in the eighteenth
6
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §2 (5th
ed. 1984). 7David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems, and Reform,
39 VILL. L. REv. 363, 364 (1994).
8KEETON ETAL., supra note 6, at 9-10.
9Owen, supra note 7, at 368.
'old.
I 11d. at 369.
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century. 2 By the beginning of the twentieth century, punitive damages
in one form or another were recoverable in all but five states.
13
B. Function of Punitive Damages
While commentators disagree on the various functions of
punitive damages, several rationales are offered as justification. In
addition to punishment and deterrence, proponents point to the desire
of society to educate individuals and affirm societal standards of
conduct, as well as the need to aid in the enforcement of laws by
providing a greater incentive for injured parties to sue.14 Some
commentators, however, argue that punitive damages blur the
differences between criminal and tort law, fail to offer defined
standards for damage awards, and often result in excessive
punishment. 5
Despite these criticisms, it appears that punitive damages will
remain an integral component of tort law for the foreseeable future.
Assuming that courts will continue to allow juries to award punitive
damages, the principal issue becomes determining when a punitive
award is excessive. The Supreme Court directly addressed this issue
in BMW v. Gore; first, however, a review of recent cases on excessive
punitive damages may prove useful.
C. Recent Supreme Court Decisions On Excessive Punitive
Damages
1. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie
The Supreme Court began to seriously consider the growth of
punitive damages in the 1986 case Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie.'
6
Appealing a jury verdict of $3.5 million on a claim of less than $2000,
Aetna Insurance Company asserted that such an award was
"impermissible under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment," and that the lack "of sufficient standards governing
12Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 274 (1989).
13Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont allowpunitive damages only
when statutorily granted; Nebraska's constitution precludes punitive damages. See Owen, supra
note 7, at 369 n.30 (citing Charles T. McCormick, Law of Damages 278-279(1935)).
14See Owen, supra note 7, at 374-380.
15See, e.g., Owen, supra note 7, at 382-400.
16475 U.S. 813 (1986).
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punitive damage awards... violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'" The Court failed to address the punitive
damages issue, instead reversing the lower court's decision on
procedural grounds. The Court did state, however, that the notion of a
due process violation raised important issues "which, in an appropriate
setting, must be resolved.""8 Thus the stage was set for future litigation.
2. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.
In an action involving a punitive damage award granted for the
violation of federal antitrust law, the Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause "does not constrain an
award of money damages in a civil suit when the government neither
has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the
damages awarded."' 9 The Court did not address the issue of procedural
due process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because it was
not properly raised at the appellate level.20 The Court did, however,
succeed in removing a potential constitutional roadblock for recovering
punitive damages by disallowing an Eighth Amendment prohibition on
exemplary awards. The issue of procedural due process therefore
continued to evade review.
3. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip
Pacific Mutual" involved the fraudulent misappropriation of
premiums by an insurance company's agent . The jury returned a
punitive damage award of one million dollars, an amount some four
times greater than the plaintiffs compensatory damages. After
affirmation by the Alabama Supreme Court, certiorari was granted by
the United States Supreme Court.
The Court held that since jury discretion in reaching an award
is a common law principal which predates the Constitution, the
assessment of punitive damages is not "so inherently unfair as to deny
due process and be per se unconstitutional." ' Articulating what has
become a consistent theme in punitive damage litigation, Justice
17d. at 828.
"I'd. at 828-829.
19Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263-264 (1989).
2Od. at 276-277.2 1pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
221d. at 17.
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Blackmun wrote for the majority that "[w]e need not, and indeed we
cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally
acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every
case."23 The Court thus once again refused to articulate a standard for
assessing punitive damages and provided little guidance for
determining whether a future award should be deemed inappropriate.
4. TXO Productions Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
The Supreme Court moved closer to adopting a standard for
determining which punitive damage awards are excessive with its
decision in TXO Productions Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.24 TXO
was assessed a ten million dollar punitive damage judgment for its
attempts to fraudulently reduce the royalty payments the company
owed Alliance.25 The Court, in a plurality opinion, concluded that
since proper judicial procedures were followed, due process was
satisfied.26 While the Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that there
should be a reasonable relationship between actual and punitive
damages, actual damages alone are not the only means of determining
rationality:
It is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the
potential harm that the defendant's conduct would
have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan
had succeeded, as well as the possible harm to other
victims that might have resulted if similar future
behavior were not deterred.27
In other words, the Court recognized that actual damage, while an
important factor in determining whether the punitive award was
appropriate, is not by itself dispositive. Other factors, such as the risk
of harm the plaintiff was exposed to or the recklessness of the
defendant's action, may be considered in determining an exemplary
damage award.
231d. at 18.
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L1. BMW . GORE
A. Facts
In 1990, Dr. Ira Gore, Jr. bought a new BMW from an Alabama
dealership. Desiring to "make the car a little snazzier than it would
normally appear," Dr. Gore took his automobile to a detail shop where
he was informed that the car had previously been repainted.28 Dr.
Gore's investigation revealed that the car was damaged by acid rain in
transit and was subsequently repaired by the manufacturer prior to
sale.29
Dr. Gore brought suit against BMW in Alabama state court,
alleging that the automaker's failure to disclose the repair constituted
fraud and suppression of a material fact.3" Gore sought $4000 in
compensatory damages and a punitive damage award of four million
dollars." Thejury returned a verdict in favor of Gore and awarded him
the requested four million dollars in punitive damages. 2 On appeal,
the Supreme Court ofAlabama affirmed BMW's liability, but subjected
the punitive damage award to a two million dollar remittitur. 3 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversing and remanding the case.
B. Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens held that the two
million dollar punitive award was "grossly excessive"34 and "transcends
the constitutional limit" established by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.35 The Court began its analysis by determining
whether the jury considered BMW's out-of-state conduct in reaching
its award, and if so, whether the granting of punitive damages
constituted an unfair infringement by the state of Alabama upon the
28BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563. (1996).
2Id. at 563 n. 1.3
Id. at 563.
31Id. at 564. The $4000 represented a former dealer's estimate of the decline in value
of Dr. Gore's BMW. The S4 million punitive award was derived by taking the amount of money
BMW saved by selling repainted cars at full price and multiplying this number by the amount of
ears that had been repainted nationwide.
32 1d. at 565.
33Id. at 567. The remittitur was done to include only ears that were sold in Alabama,
as the jury's calculation was based on national sales figures. A state court, the Alabama Supreme
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policy decisions of other states. While noting that Alabama has a
legitimate state interest in "prohibiting deceptive trade practices and
... requiring distributors to disclose presale repairs that affect the value
of a new car,"36 the Court nonetheless concluded that Alabama
exceeded its authority in punishing BMW for acts committed in other
jurisdictions.
The Court then addressed whether the Alabama Supreme
Court's remittitur of two million dollars complied with the
requirements of substantive due process. The Court noted that
"[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of
the penalty the state may impose."37 The majority relied upon three
"guideposts" in determining that BMW had received inadequate notice
of its potential liability: the degree of reprehensibility of the act, the
ratio between the harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive
damage award, and applicable sanctions for comparable misconduct.38
1. The Degree of Reprehensibility
The nature of the conduct in question is the first guidepost in
evaluating the size of the punitive damage award. As Justice Stevens
wrote, "Perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of
a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct."39 Based upon this standard, the Court held the
two million dollar award to be an excessive punishment for BMW's
transgressions. In noting that "none of the aggravating factors
associated with particularly reprehensible conduct was present,"' the
Court relied upon BMW's lack of "deliberate false statements, acts of
affirmative misconduct or concealment of evidence of improper
motive.""1 Rather, the harm inflicted by BMW was purely economic






4 'd. at 579.
41ld. at 576.
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2. Ratio of Punitive to Actual Damages
The Court then proceeded to state that "[t]he second and
perhaps most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive
punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual harm inflicted on the
plaintiff."'43 The majority then reviewed the ratios in previous cases,
but did not state that the ratio in BMW, by itself, was dispositive on the
issue of excessiveness. In rejecting any "bright line approach," the
Court registered its disfavor of any "mathematical formula" for
determining the appropriate level of punitive damages." However,
"[w]hen the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1 ... the award must surely
'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow'." '45 Thus, in the absence of proof
that the plaintiff may incur further damages, the award of two million
dollars was a grossly excessive penalty for the actual harm suffered.
3. Comparable Misconduct
Under the third and final guidepost, the Court compared the
punitive damages award to "civil or criminal penalties that could be
imposed for comparable misconduct." '46 The Court observed that
Alabama imposes a maximum statutory penalty for deceptive trade
practices at $2000; similar fines in other states range as high as
$10,000. 4 7 Because the penalty for this conduct was minimal, BMW
could not have reasonably foreseen the staggering liability it incurred
for its actions. Further, past civil awards in Alabama would be unlikely
to alert BMW that its trade practice of refinishing damaged cars could
result in a multimillion dollar verdict against the automaker. BMW
was therefore not subject to fair notice of its prospective liability, a
violation of the automaker's due process rights. Finally, the size of the
penalty was not justifiable from a deterrent standpoint since "a
multimillion dollar [award] .. . sheds no light on the question [of]
whether a lesser deterrent would have adequately protected the...
Alabama consumers."'48
After reviewing these guideposts in light of the facts in BMW,









"transcended the constitutional limit." 9 The case was remanded for a
determination of damages consistent with the opinion.
C. The Dissents
Two dissents were filed in BMW. Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, questioned the propriety of the Supreme Court
extending the doctrine of procedural due process to punitive damages,
declaring that the Court's activities in this area constitute "an
unjustified incursion into the province of state governments.""° Toward
this end, Scalia interprets the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause as an assurance of the "opportunity to contest the reasonableness
of a damages judgment in state court; but there is no federal guarantee
a damages award actually be reasonable."'" In other words, the
Fourteenth Amendment assures only procedural, not substantive, due
process in the arena of punitive damages.
Justice Scalia then examined the test established by the
majority, declaring that the three guideposts "mark a road to nowhere;
they provide no real guidance at all."52 The Justice states that the
guideposts do not constrain or offer guidance to lower courts, but rather
"[do] nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis
upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular award of
punitive damages was not 'fair'." 3
In a second dissent Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, agreed with Justice Scalia's argument that the Court should
"resist unnecessary intrusion into an area dominantly of state
concern."54 Justice Ginsburg continues, "the excessiveness of the
award is the sole issue genuinely presented.""5 Like Scalia, Ginsburg
is of the opinion that the Court's three part test is ineffective in its
attempt to regulate punitive damages. Additionally, Justice Ginsburg
seems to have doubts regarding the propriety of the Court's
involvement in this action and warns that "[t]he decision leads us
further into territory traditionally within the states' domain,... [t]he
Court is not well equipped for this mission." 6 The belief that punitive
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damage awards are best left to the states is supported by an appendix
provided by Justice Ginsburg, which details the various reforms and
limitations state legislatures have imposed upon punitive damages.57
Underlying this assertion is the traditional notion of federalism. Simply
put, the states' authority to regulate punitive damages arising from
tortious acts committed within its borders should not be restricted by
the federal government.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent, while skeptical of the Court's
authority to regulate material traditionally left to the state, does not
directly challenge the constitutionality of the Court's decision, but
rather focuses on what she deems to be an ineffective and inconsistent
ruling. The holding, Ginsburg and Rehnquist believe, simply fails to
adequately provide an analytical framework for courts to follow.
In. APPLYING THE STANDARDS OF BMW v. GORE
In the brief time that has elapsed since BMW was decided,
several courts have applied the guideposts test with mixed results. Of
particular concern in this comment is the application of limitations on
punitive damages to state-law toxic tort actions, which are actions
based upon environmental pollution and/or misconduct. This section
will first examine Kentucky case law before considering BMW's
application in other jurisdictions.
A. Kentucky
Kentucky courts to date have only applied BMW within the
punitive damages context in two cases. In Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp. v. Golightly 8 an individual suffering from throat cancer and
asbestosis brought a products liability action against Owens-Coming,
manufacturer of the pipecover. Golightly, who installed piping for over
thirty years, alleged the asbestos contained in the insulation was a
substantial factor in his illness. 9 The jury agreed and awarded
Golightly $290,000 in compensatory damages and $435,000 in punitive
damages.6"
57Id. at 614-619.





On appeal Owens-Coming claimed, inter alia, the award was
excessive and thus in violation of the BMW standards.6' The Kentucky
Supreme Court quickly rejected this argument, stating "[w]e have
examined the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in BMW
... and are satisfied that it does not require reversal of the punitive
damages verdict in this case."' 2 The initial application of BMW in
Kentucky thus suggests the courts will feel free to maintain punitive
damage awards for state toxic tort actions.
The second application of BMW is Houchens v. Rockwell
International,63 an action in which a group of landowners along the
Mud River sued Rockwell, a corporation whose Kentucky plant
produced various types of machinery. Brought in state court, the
plaintiffs complaint alleged nuisance, trespass, and diminished
property value as a result of Rockwell's contamination of the river with
chemicals used in the production and upkeep of the plant's machinery.'
The plaintiffs further claimed that Rockwell had engaged in a
deliberate campaign to mislead the landowners and the state as to the
seriousness and extent of pollution, as well as improperly altering the
test results to disguise the amount of contamination."
The jury returned a judgment of eight million dollars in
compensatory damages and a staggering $210 million in punitive
damages." The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in a currently unpublished
opinion, vacated this award as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment
based upon the guideposts provided in BMW.
B. Other Jurisdictions
1. Degree of Reprehensibility
Courts that have applied the BMW standards have frequently
relied upon the nature of the defendant's act injustifying a large punitive
damages award. In Hampton v. Dillard,67 an award of $ 1.1 million was




No. 93-158 (Ky. Cir. Ct.).
641d.
66See Verdicts and Settlements: $217 million Awarded Against Rockwell for PCB
Runoff, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996 at AI5.
6718 F.Supp.2d 1256 (D. Kan. 1998).
681d.
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Court for Kansas, in applying the first guidepost, held that the degree of
reprehensibility present "is assuredly higher [here] than the defendant's
conduct in Gore (repainting a car before selling it)." 9 A similar result
was reached in Southeastern Security Ins. Co. v. Hotle,70 where the
Georgia Court of Appeals found sexual harassment to be significantly
more reprehensible than the failure to disclose repainting a car.7' The
court relied upon the ambiguity of the BMW language, stating "although
the Supreme Court found the ratio.., to be suspect in the BMW case, it
once again reiterated its rejection of a categorical approach to the
calculation of damages. 72
In McDermott v. Party City Corp.,73 a store manager was sued
for breach of fiduciary duties when he left his job and opened a
competing business nearby. The jury returned a verdict containing a
large punitive damages award which the defendant appealed as
violative of BMW.74 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania rejected this argument. In reaching this
decision, the court examined whether the award was excessive under
either the applicable state or federal law. After finding that the award
was permissible under Pennsylvania law, the court turned to the BMW
issue.7"
The district court began by identify'ing the guideposts. set forth
by the Supreme Court. Under this analysis, a breach of fiduciary duty
was held to be reprehensible, justifying the punitive award.76 It therefore
appears that the element of intent is critical in determining the degree of
reprehensibility. The actions of BMW, while fraudulent, did not
constitute any affirmative acts of misconduct, nor did BMW attempt to
deliberately mislead consumers. This lack of intent was critical in the
Court's decision to vacate the judgment against BMW.
Toxic tort cases, however, frequently do not involve situations
where a corporation deliberately intended to contaminate the
environment. Rather, toxic tort litigation appears to often focus upon
69
1d. at 1277.
70473 S.E. 2d 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
"I1d. at 261.72
1d.
7311 F.Supp. 2d 612 (E.D.Pa. 1998).
74
1d. at 617.75
Under Pennsylvania law, there is no requirement of proportionality between
compensatory and punitive damages. Rather, the focus is on the relationship between the award
and the state's interest in punishment and deterrence. The court concluded that the award was
appropriate in this case. See McDermott v. Party City Corp., I I F.Supp. 2d 612, 629-630.76
McDermott v Party City Corp., I I F.Supp. at 631-632.
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negligent actions of a corporation. In Johansen v. Combustion
Engineering, Inc., 7 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia reduced a forty-five million award, due in large
extent to the lack of reprehensible conduct.7 8 In applying the BMW
guideposts, the court concluded that "the award is simply not
commensurate with the degree of reprehensibility of Combustion's
conduct."7 9 The Georgia court therefore reduced the punitive award
based upon the defendant's lack of intent or recklessness.8" The
McDermott decision, however, suggests that breach of a duty owed to
the plaintiffs could be considered reprehensible. While the breach in
McDermott was intentional, it is possible that courts could extend the
"degree of reprehensible conduct" requirement to include negligent
breach of duty. Such an interpretation oflBMWwould have significance
in toxic tort actions, where the defendant certainly owes a duty to
prevent environmental pollution.
In cases involving deliberate acts of environmental pollution,
however, it appears clear that courts will find the reprehensibility
requirement to be met. In an action involving exposure to a carcinogenic
asbestos product, a Florida court upheld a thirty-one million dollar
punitive damage award."1 While stating that the 17:1 ratio "raises our
judicial eyebrows at first glance, it does not shock our judicial
conscience given the instant facts." 2 The court largely relied upon the
reprehensibility of the conduct in justifying the verdict, stating that the
defendant "knew of the deleterious health risks associated with Kaylo
[asbestos product] for decades, yet consciously made a purely economic
decision not to warn its consumers, change its process, remove the
asbestos, and/or replace the fibers. 3  Intentional environmental
pollution, it therefore seems, will likely preclude a reduction of a
punitive award on appeal.
Nearly four years after the BMW decision, uncertainties still
exist as to how courts will interpret the reprehensibility guidepost in
toxic tort actions, specifically when the damage is purely economic and
not intentional. It appears a safe assumption, however, that the greater





81See Owens-Coming Fiberglass v Ballard, 1998 WL 204710 (Fla.App.4 Dist.).82
Owens-Corning Fiberglass v Ballard, 1998 WL 204710 at 4.83
Id.
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the severity of the pollution, coupled with the existence of mens rea, the
greater the likelihood that courts will find the action reprehensible.
2. Ratio
The Supreme Court's decision to explicitly reject a "bright line
mathematical formula" in determining punitive damages has provided
courts with the opportunity to affirm punitive damage awards that
involve widely disproportionate ratios. In both BMW and TXO, the
Court upheld punitive awards where the ratio was not more than 10:1,
but as one court noted, "that is not to say that the Supreme Court has
drawn any constitutional line at a 10:1 ratio."84 In fact, courts have
upheld awards where the ratio was much greater. In Johansen, the
Georgia Federal District Court set the multiplier at a 100:1 punitive to
compensatory ratio. 5 Other courts have allowed ratios ranging from
500:1 to 65,000:1, depending in large part on both the degree of
reprehensibility and the size of financial harm caused.
6
Plaintiffs find support for these large exemplary awards in the
language of BMW While the Court acknowledges that "a comparison
between the compensatory award and the punitive award is significant,"
no constitutional line is drawn. 7 In fact, the Court expressly identifies
certain instances where disproportionate ratios are appropriate. Indeed,
low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher
ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a "particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages"
or where "the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of the
noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine."88 This
rather ambiguous language has allowed courts wide discretion in
evaluating punitive award ratios. An examination of punitive awards that
have survived constitutional review may provide insight into future
judicial interpretations.
841d. at 4.85Johansen v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 1997 WL 423108 at 5.
86
See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993);
Southeastern Security Ins. Co. v. Hotle, 473 S.E. 2d 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (awarding St of
actual damages and $65,000 in punitive damages).
87North American BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 581.
581d. at 582.
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Table I
Case Compensatory Punitive Ratio Upheld
BMW $4000 2,000,000 500:1 No
Haslip 210,000 840,000 4:1 Yes
TXO 62,000 184,000 8:1 Yes
McDermott 42,538 375,000 9:1 Yes
Owens-Corning 1,800,000 31,000,000 17:1 Yes
Johansen* 47,000 -15,000,000 319:1 No
Hampton 56,000 1,100,000 20:1 Yes
* on remand, a ratio of 100:1 was applied
Thus, in toxic tort cases, the implementation of the ratio
guidepost is unlikely, by itself, to mandate reversal. As evidenced by the
above figures, courts will find sufficient precedent to justify virtually
any exemplary award, even if the ratio is disproportionate. Punitive
damages in toxic tort actions, therefore, do not appear to be unduly
limited by the BMW decision.
3. Comparable Misconduct
The third and final guidepost is unlikely to provide any
significant barrier in recovering punitive damage awards in
environmental pollution cases. This is due in large part to the array of
substantial penalties that may be imposed upon violators of
environmental laws, such as significant fines and prison sentences. For
example, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act provides for criminal
penalties ranging from a maximum of $25,000 per day for negligent
violations to a maximum of $50,000 per day fine for intentional
pollution. 89 Individuals under the Federal Facility Compliance Act are
subject to fines of $50,000 per day, while corporations face penalties of
up to one million dollars. 9 Finally, CERCLA specifically allows for
civil penalties up to $25,000 per day for environmental violations.9
Further, the Sixth Circuit has held that those who pollute the
environment are subject to punishment under all applicable federal and
state statutes. In US. v Edible Oil Products, Inc.,9 2 the court rejected the
defendant's arguments that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
8933 U.S.C. §1319 (c)(1-2).
9042 U.S.C. §6928(e).
9142 U.S.C. §9609(b).
92922 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1991).
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Amendment prohibited multiple prosecutions for the same offense.
Louisville Edible Oil Products claimed that since they had been fined by
a local air pollution board, additional fines were unconstitutional. In
rejecting this argument, the court of appeals stated that "because the
actions taken by the federal and state government are those of
independent sovereigns" it is permissible for each sovereign to punish
the activity separately.93 The defendant argued in the alternative that
the double jeopardy clause prohibits the federal government from
punishing the same conduct under different statutes, thereby making the
imposed fines unconstitutional.94 The court rejected this assertion as
well, holding that
where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or
only one is whether each provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not.95
Applying this analysis, the court found no double jeopardy
problem with the imposition of fines under both the Clean Air Act and
CERCLA, as both statutes require different elements of proof. Thus, it
is clear that environmental polluters are subject to significant fines under
relevant statutes. Plaintiffs bringing suit for environmental infractions
therefore have a significant basis for justifying large punitive damage
awards due to the size of the fines an environmental polluter is subject
to under federal guidelines. Further, such statutes serve to provide
sufficient notice to corporations and individuals regarding the severity
of toxic torts, precluding procedural due process arguments.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in BMW v. Gore illustrates a
desire by the Court to deal with what is widely perceived to be
excessive punitive damage awards. In holding the judgment against
BMW to be a violation of the defendant's constitutional due process
rights, the Court endeavored to provide a framework for determining the
validity of exemplary awards. In establishing its three guideposts,
93U.S. v Edible Oil Products, Inc., 922 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1991).
94Id. at 584.95Id. at 588.
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however, the Court refrained from adopting a "bright line test," choosing
instead to offer rather vague directions. As evidenced by the language
in the opinion, courts are allowed a great deal of latitude in determining
the constitutionality of a punitive award. A study of case law
subsequent to the BMW decision indicates that the courts have not
hesitated to exercise this discretion.
Regarding punitive damages for toxic tort actions, it is apparent
that the BMW decision will not significantly reduce punitive recoveries.
The third guidepost, comparable sanctions, provides little if any
restrictions on awarding exemplary damages given the enormous fines
which may be imposed for environmental pollution. The ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages, while a higher bar, nonetheless
does not appear to provide a definitive means for reducing awards. The
final guidepost, the degree of reprehensibility, described as "the most
important indicium," presents the greatest possibility of protection for
defendants. This protection, however, will extend primarily to negligent
acts, as intentional acts of environmental pollution will almost invariably
be deemed reprehensible. It remains to be seen how courts will apply
this guidepost in negligent actions, although it is possible that
reprehensibility will be inferred in cases of recklessness or gross
negligence based upon the seriousness of the pollution.
The decision in BMWv. Gore, the controlling case regarding the
constitutionality of punitive damage awards, can best be described not
as a culmination of a series of exemplary damage cases, but rather as
another step in the evolution ofpunitive damage jurisprudence. As such,
courts should recognize the BMW decision not as a definitive analytical
model for determining whether a punitive award is excessive, but rather
as a requirement that liability imposed upon a defendant must meet the
essential requirements of fairness and reasonableness.
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